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ffective tax collection is key to a well-function-
ing state. Tax evasion is thus a major policy 
concern in much of the OECD. In Estonia, the gov-
ernment is estimated to have missed out on 4.9% of 
its budget or 1.44% of GDP due to the shadow econ-
omy (Maksu- ja Tolliamet, 2017). One promising ap-
proach to combating tax evasion involves applying 
nudges, or small interventions designed to leverage 
insights about how people behave (for an overview, 
see Blackwell, 2007; Hallsworth, 2014; Hallsworth, 
List, Metcalfe, & Vlaev, 2017). This approach, how-
ever, has yielded mixed results.  
Most field experiments employing nudges to-
wards tax compliance have tested the effects of 
nudges using either a non-deterrence or a deterrence  
framework. Non-deterrence nudges have targeted 
social norms (Blumenthal & Christian, 2001; Castro 
& Scartascini, 2015; Fellner, Sausgruber, & Traxler, 
2013; Hallsworth et al.,  2017; Hasseldine, Hite, 
James, & Toumi, 2007; John & Blume, 2018), moral 
persuasion (Ariel, 2012; Fellner, Sausgruber, & 
Traxler, 2013; Hasseldine et al., 2007; Torgler, 2004; 
Wenzel, 2006), and reciprocity (Blumenthal & Chris-
tian, 2001; Castro & Scartascini, 2015; Hallsworth, et 
al., 2017; Hasseldine et al., 2007). Deterrence nudges 
have targeted awareness of legal sanctions (Has-
seldine et al., 2007; Iyer, Reckers, & Sanders, 2010; 
Schwartz & Orleans, 1967), and the perceived risk of 
getting caught or being audited (Ariel, 2012; Fellner 













Abstract: Changing complex behaviors such as tax evasion may require several behavioral interventions, or 
nudges. We developed a tailored compound intervention approach to increase employers’ payroll tax compli-
ance in Estonia’s construction industry. First, we used anthropological methods to gain insights into the deci-
sion processes of employers and employees in the industry (Study 1, N=16). These insights were combined 
with behavioral decision-making principles to design an intervention e-mail with the aim to strengthen per-
ceived risks and weaken descriptive norms of non-compliance as well as to strengthen collaborative and 
weaken adversarial construal of tax authority. The compound intervention was tested using a three-armed 
non-blinded randomized controlled trial (Study 2, N=4770) involving all employers whose declared wages  
were below 70% of the industry’s average. The intervention significantly increased declared payroll taxes by 
5.1% to 6.1% on average across the two treated groups over a 3-month follow-up period (p< .0001) and was 
therefore effective. It remains unclear which constituent nudges of our compound intervention were crucial 
for this effect. These findings suggest that the compound intervention approach may be a feasible avenue for 
designing effective interventions in under-studied contexts. 
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2014; Hasseldine et al., 2007; Iyer, et al., 2010; Kleven, 
Knudsen, Kreiner, Pedersen, & Saez, 2011; Pomer-
anz, Alesina, Asher, Casaburi,  Chetty, Cutler, Wein-
zierl, 2013; Schwartz & Orleans, 1967). While some 
of these studies have demonstrated significant im-
provements in tax compliance, others have not (Hall-
sworth, 2014) or have found an intervention to back-
fire by reducing tax compliance (Ariel, 2012; Gangl 
et al., 2014; Mendoza, Wielhouwer, & Kirchler, 2017). 
Therefore, policy-makers may find it difficult to de-
sign evidence-informed interventions that would in-
crease the likelihood of tax compliance. 
One reason for mixed results in previous trials  
may be their relatively narrow focus on targeting a 
single underlying psychological mechanism at a time. 
While such focus makes it easier to infer causes of 
observed effects, it may not be optimal for maximis-
ing intervention effectiveness. Each individual psy-
chological mechanism tends to have only a small and 
context-dependent effect on a complex behavioural 
pattern such as tax compliance (Funder & Ozer, 
2019). Meanwhile, there could be further interactions 
between different nudges, so that a combination of 
them enhances (or offsets) their individual effects. 
The existing evidence describing the effects of single 
nudges is therefore insufficient for designing inter-
ventions that seek to amplify effectiveness by com-
bining several nudges. In addition, policy-makers 
need a systematic way to combine different nudges 
into context-sensitive effective interventions. To this 
end, we propose a tailored compound intervention 
(TCI) approach which involves combining several 
nudges based on an analysis of the relevant complex 
behaviour.  
Akin to a personalised combination of medica-
tions, TCIs facilitate behavioral change by combining 
several active ingredients (i.e., nudges) to simultane-
ously target several mechanisms underlying one 
problematic behavior (i.e., tax evasion). Designing 
tailored compound interventions involves two steps. 
First, a working model needs to be constructed that 
identifies potential intervention targets among the 
decisions that the target group makes, consciously or 
otherwise, when engaging in the problematic behav-
iour. Second, a compound intervention needs to be 
designed by selecting which of the identified targets 
can be addressed with a feasible combination of 
available nudges. This approach does not guarantee 
finding the most efficient combination of “active in-
gredients”. However, for complex behaviors and in 
circumstances where there is little evidence of the ef-
fectiveness of individual nudges, a theory-based TCI 
is a useful starting point for creating evidence-based 
interventions. 
In the present article, we assess the feasibility of 
the TCI approach by applying it to increase payroll 
tax compliance in the construction sector in Estonia. 
Payroll taxes — here considered in a broad sense, 
covering all labor taxes and contributions either 
payed by the employer or withheld on behalf of the 
employee — are a complex and understudied aspect 
of tax compliance. Evidence from prior field experi-
ments targeting the behavior of individual taxpayers 
may not generalise to the behavior of employers and 
companies (see Hallsworth, 2014). At present, it is 
unclear whether nudges can affect employers’ tax be-
havior – out of five studies reported by Hallsworth 
(2014), only two reported significant positive effects 
(Ortega & Sanguitti, 2013; Pomeranz et al., 2013). 
In this paper, we will focus on payroll tax com-
pliance in the construction industry which has been 
among the top shadow economy concern areas for 
tax authorities (OECD, 2012). To apply the TCI ap-
proach for reducing payroll tax evasion, we first de-
veloped a working model of payroll tax compliance 
in the construction industry by combining existing 
literature with an anthropological study of the target 
group, summarised as Study 1 in this paper. We then 
designed a compound intervention and conducted a 
randomised controlled trial to assess its effectiveness, 
presented as Study 2 in this paper.  
 
Study 1: Identifying Intervention Targets 
 
To establish a working model of the decision-making 
processes governing employer’s compliance with 
payroll taxes in Estonia, we combined insights from 
the psychology of tax compliance (Kastlunger, Lozza, 
Kirchler, & Schabmann, 2013; Kirchler, Muelbacher, 
Kastlunger, & Wahl, 2010) with an empirical study of 
representatives of the industry.  
 
Method 
Fifteen semi-structured in-depth interviews with 16 
interviewees were conducted in January and February 
2018. The volunteer sample was a cross-section of 
the population in terms of gender, age, tenure, size of 
company, status, and mother tongue (for more detail, 
please see Appendix A). The interviews were rec-
orded and transcribed by the interviewers, with the 
assurance that the interviewees would remain anony-
mous to the remaining research group as well as rep-
resentatives of the Estonian Tax and Customs Board 




(TCB). The transcripts were analysed to identify ma-
jor narrative themes (Braun & Clarke, 2006) charac-
terising the target group’s decision-making (see Ap-
pendix C for details). The analysis was conducted by 
the corresponding author, triangulating the results 
with other co-authors, including the interviewers. 
The emerging themes were also situated within psy-
chological models of tax compliance and nudge in-
terventions, yielding a working model of the tax com-
pliance decision.  
 
Results 
Four major themes emerged from the interviews. 
       Not paying pays off. The employers character-
ised tax compliance in terms of a cost-benefit analysis. 
In order to survive the competitive market, especially 
that of sub-contracts, employers felt forced to take 
up projects that have low to no profit margins. 
Within this framework, evading taxes became a way 
to “save” money so long as the risk of getting caught 
was considered low.  
       Not paying is the norm. We found the sub-
contractors deemed undeclared salaries the norm: “I 
don’t know any company where the whole salary is 
paid officially” (Interviewee 5). A few respondents 
also thought that the shadow economy was in decline.  
       Unfair government. Several interviewees 
found the government overly controlling of the en-
trepreneurs while allowing politicians to spend irrat- 
ionally. Others had either had a negative experience 
with a government agency (e.g., TCB or the police) 
or did not think they were receiving enough public 
services in return (e.g., long healthcare waiting lists). 
This led to a sense of unfairness: paying tax was seen 
as handing out money in order to employ “an army 
of bureaucrats” with no reciprocated benefit. 
       Red tape. Several employers suggested that 
considering the burdening amount of bureaucracy, 
some agreements and financial deals were easier done 
“unofficially”: “Generally, there’s the understanding 
in the construction industry that since the tax system 




The qualitative analysis suggested that low tax com-
pliance in the construction industry is facilitated by 
the hierarchical and asymmetrical power structures 
between the main contractors and subcontracts that 
undermine fair competition, and a strong sense of 
disappointment in the government and the public 
sector. Combining these themes with principles of 
tax compliance psychology yielded a working model 
of the target group’s decisions processes regarding 
tax evasion, summarised in Table 1.  
        The model first identifies four broad sets of fea-
tures that influence decisions to pay payroll taxes in 
the Estonian construction sector: expected outcomes, 
Table 1 
Working Model of Potential Intervention Targets among Decision Processes Involved in 
Payroll Tax Compliance in the Estonian Construction Industry 
 
Feature set Prevention target Promotion target 
Expected outcomes Weaken perceived benefit 
“No need to save on taxes to 
be competitive” 
Strengthen perceived risk 
“I might get caught and be 
fined” 
Identity Weaken descriptive norm 
“Most of my peers pay taxes” 
Strengthen injunctive norm 
“The best employers pay taxes” 
Construal of tax authority Weaken adversarial con-
strual of tax authority 
“The government is not unfair 
and wasteful” 
Strengthen collaborative con-
strual of tax authority 
“My taxes are important invest-
ments into Estonia” 
Tax procedures Reduce perceived effort 
“Paying taxes is frictionless” 
Improve perceived ease 
“Paying taxes is easy” 
Notes. Each target is illustrated by a hypothetical expression of a target group member induced by an intervention ; 
targets marked in bold were selected for targeting by the compound intervention tested in Study 2. 




identity, construal of tax authority, and tax proce-
dures. It then identifies potential targets for interven-
tion among each of the identified four decision fea-
tures. It further distinguishes between prevention tar-
gets—decision processes that have an undesirable 
impact on tax compliance and should therefore be 
prevented by an intervention, and promotion tar-
gets—decision processes that have a desirable impact 
on decisions and should therefore be promoted by 
an intervention. 
 
Study 2: Nudging Construction Industry  
towards Payroll Tax Compliance 
 
We selected four intervention targets out of the eight 
described in Table 1 for the TCI tested in Study 2. 
The selection was based on expert judgements of the 
authors, relying on existing evidence of nudging ef-
fectiveness as well as evidence collected in Study 1. 
More specifically, we evaluated each element in the 
model presented in Table 1 using three criteria: a) to 
what extent would a change in the given decision fea-
ture lead to a change in tax compliance, b) to what 
extent could the given decision feature be changed 
via e-mail and text messaging, and c) what is the risk 
that a nudge targeting this element would backfire?  
Four potential intervention targets had favour-
able assessments on all three criteria: 1) strengthening 
perceived risk; 2) weakening descriptive norms; 3) 
weakening adversarial construal of tax authority, and 
4) strengthening collaborative construal of tax au-
thority. Strengthening perceived risk of audit has 
been reported to increase tax compliance between 2 
and 14.1 percentage points (Del Carpio, 2014; Fellner, 
Sausgruber, & Traxler, 2013; Hasseldine, Hite, James, 
& Toumi, 2007; Pomeranz, Alesina, Asher, Casaburi,  
Chetty, Cutler, Weinzierl, 2013). Similarly, descrip-
tive norms have been suggested to improve compli-
ance by 1.3 to 5.1 percentage points (Del Carpio, 
2014; Hallsworth, List, Metcalfe, & Vlaev,  2017; 
Hasseldine, Hite, James, & Toumi, 2007). Finally, al-
tering the construal of tax authority has been recom-
mended on conceptual grounds (Kirchler, Hoelzl, & 
Wahl, 2008), although more empirical evidence is 
needed to estimate its effectiveness. We decided to 
include it since the theme strongly emerged from the 
data collected in Study 1. 
The four remaining potential targets, by con-
trast, were deemed not to meet one or more of the 
criteria. We decided against weakening perceived 
benefits as we could not change the conditions in the 
industry that give rise to this perception. We decided 
against strengthening injunctive norms to avoid the 
risk of backfiring. Tax compliance is more common 
among larger companies and less common among 
smaller companies that depend on the larger ones for 
revenue. Therefore, a message highlighting the larger 
companies as role models may further aggravate the 
sense of injustice felt by the smaller companies. Fi-
nally, we also decided against reducing perceived ef-
fort or improving perceived ease of tax compliance 
given that these decision features were deemed not 






In collaboration with both the TCB and the inter-
viewers, we designed two versions of an e-mail which 
included several manipulations addressing the four 
targets identified in Table 1. We chose e-mails as our 
medium since it is used in most communication be-
tween government agencies and citizens in Estonia 
while paper letters are rare. The two e-mail versions 
differed in the description of potential penalties, 
which was implicit in one and explicit in the other 
(see Appendix D for the translation of the e-mails 
together with the intervention targets). The primary 
target was to strengthen perceived risks: the e-mail 
announced new initiatives including upcoming audits 
to combat undeclared payroll taxes (though not 
strictly related to the intervention), suggested that the 
recipient may be selected for the audit, and implied 
the audit may be avoided through increased compli-
ance. To further bolster a sense of accountability, the 
e-mails were addressed to the board of management, 
greeted them by their full names, and used the com-
pany name in the body of the e-mail.  
Additionally, the letters weakened the adversar-
ial construal of the tax authority by stating that assur-
ing fair competition is a priority for the TCB — a 
common concern for the entrepreneurs as well as the 
TCB. Furthermore, the letters strengthened the col-
laborative construal of the tax authority by exempli-
fying the investment value of payed payroll taxes. 
The letters stated that the overall lost revenue is 
about the same as the combined annual budgets of  
ambulance and fire services—two services that have 
enjoyed the highest levels of public trust in Estonia 
(Kivirähk, 2018). Fourth, the letters weakened de-
scriptive norms by stating that 92% of employees re-
ceive their salaries with due taxes deducted.2 All the 
facts in the letters were accurate and reflected our be- 




st knowledge.  
 
Participants 
The sample included employers in the construction 
industry according to the Estonian Classification of 
Economic Activities’ code. Eligibility criteria were 
assessed by an analyst in the TCB. We included em-
ployers who, in the period of October 2017 to March 
2018, had declared payments to their employees that 
were lower than 70% of the average in the construc-
tion industry over the same time period. This crite-
rion is used by TCB to calculate their risk factor for 
tax evasion. We excluded employers who, at the time 
of calculating the 70% cut-off, were audited by TCB. 
Among the remaining pool of employers, interven-
tion groups’ chances of being audited were the same 
as for the control group. Companies that met the el-
igibility criteria were pseudonymised at the TCB and 




E-mails were sent to two intervention groups. The 
control group did not receive an e-mail, and thus is 
considered as the business as usual (BAU) group. To 
heighten the chances of the e-mail being read, we also 
sent all its recipients the following mobile text mes-
sage: “The Tax and Customs Board has sent you a 
message to [email address]”. We were not able to de-
termine whether the recipients read the text messages 
or the e-mails. 
Both the e-mails and the text messages were 
sent using TCB’s in-house software, IRIS, on 29th 
May 2018. Because of the legal requirement to use 
IRIS which does not allow randomisation within its 
system, we could not run a blinded trial. Instead, the 
TCB provided us with a pseudonymised list of em-
ployers, which we randomly allocated to the two in-
tervention groups and the BAU group. The random-
isation of the employers (1:1:1) was done by the cor-
responding author using RStudio version 1.0.136 
running on R version x64 3.3.1 and the package ran-
domize R (Uschner, Schindler, Hilgers, & Heussen, 
2018). 
An information phone line was set up by the 
TCB with a number provided in the e-mails. The call 
centre personnel were aware of the trial but unaware 
of its contents and blinded to the randomisation. 
They were instructed to consult the clients as usual, 
without revealing the experiment, to avoid affecting 
recipients’ behavior. To test the impact of the e-mails 
on TCB’s customer services, we ran a pilot study with 
150 employers (randomised 1:1:1, more details in Ap-
pendix E). The participants of the pilot study were 
excluded from the main study and their data are not 
included in the analyses reported in this paper. 
 
Measures 
The effect of the interventions was measured using 
data from TCB’s routine employers’ monthly payroll 
tax declarations. We observed declared employer so-
cial insurance contributions (social tax) as well as em-
ployee social insurance contributions (unemploy-
ment, funded pension) and personal income tax 
withheld from gross salaries by employers — here la-
belled altogether as ‘payroll taxes’ — adjusted for the 
number of full time equivalent (FTE) employees. 
Payroll taxes declared for the month of April and 
May, that is prior to the intervention, were consid-
ered as the baseline. We investigated the effect of the 
intervention on payroll taxes declared for June, July, 
and August. The TCB provided information on the  
following variables: number of employees, full-time 
equivalent (FTE) employees, declared gross salary, 
social tax, unemployment insurance contribution, 




Our main dependent variable is the amount of pay-
roll taxes, adjusted for the number of full-time equiv-
alent workers, though we also ran alternative models 
for (log) gross earnings (FTE) and obtained qualita-
tively similar results (available on request). To esti-
mate the treatment effects on payroll taxes per FTE, 
we used the difference-in-difference approach with 
employer-level monthly panel data. The regression 
model includes time and group fixed effects and the 
interaction terms between the groups and the inter-
vention (either implicit (I) or explicit (E) outcomes 
condition): 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑔 𝑡 = 𝛾𝑔 + 𝜆 𝑡 + 𝛽𝑔𝐼𝑔𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑔𝑡  
 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑔𝑡 is the dependent variable reported by firm 
i (𝑖 = 1 … 𝑁)  in group g (BAU, implicit outcomes, ex-
plicit outcomes) for month t (𝑡 = 𝐴𝑝𝑟, … , 𝐴𝑢𝑔), 𝛾𝑔  is 
the group fixed effect), 𝜆𝑡 captures the time trend (i.e. 
dummies for months), 𝐼𝑔𝑡  is a dummy denoting 
whether group g has been exposed to the interven-
tion by time t, (e-mails were sent out in May, after tax 
declaration), and 𝜀𝑖𝑔𝑡  is an error term. We sought to  
estimate the values of 𝛽𝑔, i.e. coefficients for firms 
receiving either the implicit or explicit outcomes e- 




mail relative to BAU while controlling for the overall 
time trend. 
 
Role of the Funding Source 
While we did cooperate with the funders when de-
signing the study — to ensure its feasibility and ap-
plicability considering the TCB standard operating 
procedures — the funders had no role in the data 
analysis, data interpretation, or write-up of this paper. 
The corresponding author had full access to the 
pseudonymised raw data and made the final decision 
to submit for publication. 
 
Results 
We first confirmed that the randomisation procedure 
had indeed produced comparable groups—the em-
ployers included in different arms of the study were 
similar in terms of number of employees and FTEs 
(Appendix F).  
Next, we estimated the linear panel data model 
of tax payments both with the fixed-effects (FE) and 
random-effects (RE) estimator. Both models were 
statistically highly significant: F statistic 103.08 for 
the FE model (p<0.001) and Wald chi2 statistic 
630.22 for the RE model (p<0.001). Here we present 
the latter as the Hausman test could not reject the 
null hypothesis that the RE estimator provides con-
sistent estimates (p=0.26). The results with the FE 
estimator are shown in Appendix H.  
The results of the regression analysis (Table 2) 
reveal, first of all, the lack of statistically significant 
differences between the intercept for the BAU group 
and the implicit outcomes treatment group (𝛾𝐼 =
4.09, 𝑝 = 0.42)  and the explicit outcomes group 
(𝛾𝐸 = 7.18, 𝑝 < 0.16) . This finding further con-
firms that the three arms of the study did not differ 
in their baseline tax reporting. Second, there was a 
clear time trend with the average amount of payroll 
taxes increasing from €15.54 (May) to €32.00 (Au-
gust).  
Finally, and most importantly, we found a posi-
tive and highly statistically significant effect for both 
e-mails (𝛾𝐼 = 11.95, 𝑝 =  .0001; 𝛾𝐸 = 15.38, 𝑝 <
 .0001). This amounts to an increase of 5.1% and 
6.1%, respectively, compared to the average payroll 
taxes in the BAU group at the start of period 
(€233.30, see Appendix G). Although the effect is 
larger for the explicit outcomes e-mail, the difference 
between the two groups is not statistically significant 
based on the Wald test (p=0.26). 
To investigate the treatment effects month-by-
month, we also estimate another version of the 
Figure 1 
Study Profile. Consort 2010 Flowchart.
 




model interacting every month with the treatment 
groups (𝐷𝑔𝑡): 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑔𝑡 = 𝛾𝑔 + 𝜆 𝑡 + 𝛽𝑔𝑡𝐷𝑔𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑔𝑡  
Figure 2 presents the results and demonstrates how 
statistically significant differences between the BAU 
and either treatment group emerged after the inter-
vention. The effect was immediate with the explicit 
Table 2 
Estimation Results for Random-Effects Panel Model 
 
       95% CI 
  Coef. SE z p Lower Upper 
Intercept 231.08 3.74 61.87 <0.0001 223.76 238.40 
Implicit outcomes group 4.09 5.09 0.80 0.42 -5.89 14.07 
Explicit outcomes group 7.18 5.11 1.40 0.16 -2.84 17.21 
Pre-intervention April-May 15.54 1.91 8.15 <0.0001 11.81 19.28 
Post-intervention 
June 21.50 2.62 8.21 <0.0001 16.37 26.63 
July 26.28 2.61 10.05 <0.0001 21.15 31.40 
August 32.00 2.63 12.19 <0.0001 26.86 37.15 
Implicit outcomes group inter-
acted with the treatment 
11.95 3.06 3.91 <0.0001 5.95 17.94 
Explicit outcomes group inter-
acted with the treatment 
15.38 3.06 5.02 <0.0001 9.37 21.38 
Notes: N (employers) = 4,262; N (observations) = 19,381; omitted reference categories are the BAU group and  
April month. Dependent variable was monthly payroll taxes per FTE. 
 
Figure 2 
Regression Estimates for the Treatment Groups in Comparison to the  
Control Group over Time (Differences-in-Differences) 
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outcomes e-mail but more gradual with the implicit 
outcomes e-mail. Month-by-month estimates also 
suggest that the implicit outcomes group was slower 
to raise their payroll tax declarations compared to the 
explicit outcomes group, though the difference is not 
statistically significant as demonstrated by overlap-
ping confidence intervals.  
 
Discussion 
Our findings suggest that the tailored compound in-
tervention e-mails increased the amount of payroll 
tax declared by the employers compared to the con-
dition where no communication was received from 
the tax authority. The letters significantly (p ≤ .0001) 
improved tax declarations per FTE employee, on av-
erage by 5.1-6.1% across the two intervention groups 
compared to not receiving an e-mail (BAU). This ef-
fect is comparable to the results reported in previous 
studies. Additionally, we found that the implicit out-
comes group was slower to raise the amounts de-
clared as payroll taxes compared to the explicit out-
comes group, though the differences were not statis-
tically significant. It is also worth emphasising that 
our sample constituted population data for the target 
group (i.e. all construction firms reporting taxes be-
low a certain level), meaning there was no uncertainty 
left in the statistical sense. Still, we have taken a con-
servative approach and treated the data as a random 
sample of an infinite population and correspondingly 




In search of effective ways to apply behavioral in-
sights to improve tax compliance, we proposed a t- 
ailored compound intervention approach and as-
sessed its feasibility in improving payroll tax report-
ing in the Estonian construction industry. We devel- 
oped a working model of the problematic behavior, 
integrating known psychological principles with qual-
itative evidence of the target group. We identified 
eight conceivable intervention targets of which we 
selected four for our intervention based on expert as-
sessments of their likely malleability to nudges, feasi-
bility for nudging through e-mail, and low likelihood 
of backfire. We tested the effectiveness of the de-
signed intervention using a three-armed randomised 
control trial. We found the intervention effective, im-
proving tax revenues per FTE employee by 5.1-6.1 
percent over a 3-month period (p ≤ .0001).  
We also compared the effect of implicit and ex-
plicit descriptions of possible outcomes of TCB dis-
covering a tax fraud. While Wenzel and Taylor (2004) 
found that their harder-toned letter led to signifi-
cantly lower overall deduction claims than a softer 
letter, our results suggest that over a 3-month period, 
both approaches yielded similar results. Based on this 
finding, we propose that implicit threats of conse-
quences may offer a useful balance between increas-
ing tax compliance and maintaining favorable public 
perception of the tax authority (see also Alm & Tor-
gler, 2011).  
One of the nudges included in our intervention 
— that of altering the construal of tax authority — 
has thus far not been widely reported. Meanwhile a 
similar concept, moral persuasion, has been reported 
to have a backfiring effect (Torgler, 2004, Pomeranz 
et al 2013). Although we cannot estimate the effect 
of any particular constituent nudge within our com-
pound intervention, contrasting the past backfiring 
effect with the present findings suggests that moral 
arguments may have a more favorable effect when 
they are not the dominant message, but instead are 
somewhat concealed within a broader message. This 
hypothesis could be worth investigating in future 
studies, especially in populations that convey adverse 
opinions towards the tax authority. 
Our study focused on employers in the con-
struction industry whose low declared salary (below 
70% of the market average) indicated a risk for tax 
evasion. The present findings cannot therefore be 
generalised with certainty to more compliant employ-
ers in the same industry. Both larger and smaller ef-
fects are conceivable. On the one hand, our TCI 
might have an even larger effect on more compliant 
employers, if they are more sensitive to a nudge than 
the less compliant employers. On the other hand, our 
TCI might also have a smaller effect on more com-
pliant employers due to regression to the mean—em-
ployers who already pay salaries closer to the market 
average may be less responsive to such an interven-
tion. 
One inevitable limitation of the targeted com-
pound intervention approach employed in this study 
is that it does not enable us to infer the effectiveness 
of each individual constituent nudge. Without future 
studies, we cannot conclude which proportions of 
the effects we observed can be attributed to strength-
ening perceived risk, weakening descriptive norms, 
or weakening adversarial and strengthening collabo- 




rative construal of tax authority. We also cannot es-
tablish that our combination of nudges was neces-
sarily the best among all possible combinations. 
However, it is unlikely that researchers will ever be 
able to measure the effectiveness of all feasible com-
binations of different nudges targeting different be-
haviors of different target groups in different con-
texts. Policy-makes therefore need an alternative way 
to design effective interventions that would leverage 
existing evidence about what is known to work as 
well as context-specific knowledge of the target 
group and its circumstance. We hope that the field-
work-informed tailored compound intervention ap-
proach presented here can serve as a roadmap to 
build evidence in under-researched areas. To this end, 
the present study demonstrates several advantages of 
this approach. The study was conducted in a distinct 
context—employers’ tax compliance in a specific 
country—for which very little evidence exists as to 
which psychological factors underly the unwanted 
behaviours and which nudges would be effective in 
changing these factors. It was also not practically fea-
sible to devise a large number of interventions testing 
various nudges separately, given the relatively small 
size of the target population. The TCI approach was 
helpful in this context, by providing a flexible way to 
construct a working model of the underlying behav-
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1.    There was a personal income tax reform, which 
took effect from 1 January 2018. While before 
the reform, income tax was paid largely propor-
tionally to one’s gross income, the reform intro-
duced a gradient whereby those earning less paid 
a smaller proportion.  
2.    This was, at the time, our best knowledge, based 
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